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 Abstract. It is my aim in this paper to demonstrate that the 
notion of true religion, in the wake of Spinoza’s Tractatus, is a floating 
signifier. A floating signifier is a signifier with a changing 
signification. What makes true religion a particularly interesting 
floating signifier is its theological-political constellation, its particular 
history – both before and after Spinoza’s usage of the term in the 
TTP – and its tremendous conceptually malleability. While this 
undoubtedly has continued relevance today, the goal of this 
contribution is to locate the ambiguities at play in the floating 
signifier of true religion as well as to trace the transformation of true 
religion into a floating signifier. In part 1, I establish that the formal 
purpose of true religion is a means to guarantee a stable or peaceful 
political community constituted by plurality. In part 2, I turn to the 
meaning of true religion, focussing on three significant ambiguities in 
the notion as developed by Spinoza. In part 3, I turn to the reception 
history of the TTP to illustrate several of the competing concerns of 
the floating signifier of true religion, and second consider some of 
the contemporary implications of each of these ambiguities.  
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While references to “true religion” in today’s European “secular” states are 
far and few between, the same cannot be said of true religion’s floating signification. A 
floating signifier is a notion “nimble enough to host a number of potentially 
competing concerns.”23 Similar to Claude Lévi-Strauss’ analysis, which highlights the 
process of emptying out a concept’s meaning, a floating signifier has a highly unstable 
meaning or referent.4 A floating signifier has not yet been fully emptied out, with each 
process of re-signification leaving its traces and new significations. According to 
Laclau who has theorised the political implication of empty signifiers, “an empty 
signifier is, strictly speaking, a signifier without a signified.”5 In addition, a floating 
signifier is also not fixed to any particular signifier – such as the term “true religion” 
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which now manifests itself in our controlled public spaces in the guise of phrases such 
as “Judeo-Christian” heritage or tradition. Zizek offers several examples of floating 
signifiers such as freedom, fascism and democracy. It is my aim in this paper to argue 
that the notion of true religion became a floating signifier in the wake of Spinoza’s 
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP) and to analyse how Spinoza contributes to its 
emptying out by probing and highlighting its fundamental ambiguities. While this 
undoubtedly has continued relevance today, the goal of this contribution is to locate 
the ambiguities at play in the floating signifier of true religion.  
True religion has its theological roots in Augustine who wrote De vera religion 
in 390 CE in which he argues that only the truth of God can lead one to freedom (a 
claim Spinoza would agree with, although his understanding of truth and God differ 
radically from those of Augustine). It is then instituted in the extra ecclesiam nulla salus 
doctrine of the Fourth Lateran Council, which declares that “There is one universal 
Church of the faithful, outside of which there is absolutely no salvation.” While the 
term ‘true religion’ clearly predates Spinoza, most famously in the works of Grotius 
and Hobbes, Spinoza probes particular ambiguities leading to its eventual emptying 
out (most visible in the Spinoza reception literature) and its eventual transformation 
into a central concept of political theology (which is visible today). Hobbes may have 
sought to do what Spinoza did, yet he “durst not write so boldly.” 67 In this sense it 
was the boldness of Spinoza’s probing amplified by his particular identity as an 
excommunicated Jew in a Christian sphere that stands out in contrast to Hobbes who 
only refers to true religion four times in the Leviathan.8 What is clear is that by the 
time of the Founding Fathers, true religion has a clearly political meaning, although the 
theological trace of its original meaning remains tangible. It is within this broader 
historical portrait that one can clearly observe the process of the emptying out and 
transformation of true religion from a theological concept to a political-theological 
floating signifier. What I intend to establish is when – and how – this process 
occurred.  
To do so, I turn to Spinoza’s TTP in which he discloses several fundamental 
paradoxes of the notion of true religion. Prior to the TTP, true religion was a 
fundamental theological concept albeit politically contested in the religious wars of 
16th and 17th century.9 After the TTP, thanks to Spinoza’s exposition of true religion’s 
fundamental ambiguities, it becomes a political concept with theological traces. He 
“empties” true religion of its demanding theological content, transforming it into a 
floating signifier. What makes true religion a particularly interesting floating signifier is 
its theological-political constellation and its tremendous malleability, conceptually 
speaking. Its manipulability, which makes it a politically powerful signifier, has its 
roots in the analysis of true religion in the TTP, which I investigate. Specifically, I 
focus on three intertwined aporias: first, reason and imagination, second, faith and 
works, and third, theology and reason. To be clear, my intention is not to explain the 
actual meaning of true religion, a project that many renowned Spinoza scholars have 
endeavoured to complete, 10  but rather to locate the ambiguities at play in the 
transformation of true religion into a floating signifier. 
In part 1, I establish that the formal purpose of true religion in the TTP is a 
means to guarantee a stable or peaceful political community constituted by plurality. 
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In this vein, it is correct to state that true religion “as opposed to sectarian religion – is 
about nothing more than moral behaviour. It is not what you believe but what you do 
that matters”.11 From a formal perspective, only deeds are a direct danger to political 
authority, so the question of motivation and accessibility – whether purely rational or 
rooted in the imagination – is not fundamental. And yet, from a substantial and 
historical perspective, beliefs and motivations matter a great deal. For this reason, in 
part 2, I turn to the meaning of true religion, which is where things begin to get 
messy. The reason for this is that it is not always easy to reconcile these ambiguities in 
the notion of true religion (which can perhaps most easily be demonstrated by the vast 
literature over the past three hundred years on this question). Rather than beginning 
from the secondary literature, I return to the text to locate the three ambiguities most 
at play in the Spinozan notion of true religion. It is based on a textual analysis of these 
three tensions that I make the step, in part 3, to the transformation of true religion 
into a floating signifier. I demonstrate this briefly, by way of conclusion, by 
considering some of the contemporary implications of each of these ambiguities.  
 
The TTP: A manual for the institution of True Religion (TR) 
Spinoza’s goal is explicitly stated in the subtitle of the Tractatus.    
 
Which show that Freedom of Philosophizing can be granted without harming 
either Piety or the Peace of the Republic, and cannot be denied without 
destroying both Piety and the Peace of the Republic.12 
While the subtitle is often overlooked it makes clear that Spinoza’s intention 
was to safeguard the freedom of opinion that was under threat in the 1660s in the 
Netherlands.13 Yet he also thought that this freedom to philosophize was fundamental 
for the faith of the multitudes and the peace of the political community. What Spinoza 
aims to explain in the TTP is the means to make all this possible. In this sense, the 
TTP is a manual for the maintenance of a peaceful political community constituted by 
diverse religious beliefs and philosophers (which clearly explains its popularity among 
political philosophers today). The greatest barrier to the peace of this community was 
the conflict that arose amongst theologians (and between theologians and 
philosophers). Thus the first step in Spinoza’s manual is a refutation of the foundation 
upon which theologians make claims to authority, which quickly shifts from the realm 
of theology to that of the political. Only after this critical process (which uses 
Spinoza’s methodology for rationally inspired biblical hermeneutic), can he proceed to 
the second step of the TTP in which the meaning of true religion is elaborated. Here 
he establishes that the universal message of the Scripture is limited to the promotion 
of obedience in terms of justice and charity as the sole means for both salvation 
(individual) and peace (collective). A third step provides an account and analysis of the 
historical institution of true religion in a political community. As this step follows 
logically from a correct reading of the first two steps, it is in some sense unessential 
for a philosopher, and yet serves to illustrate the political implications of true 
religion’s institution. Let us begin by considering the formal purpose of true religion.  
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As many a close reader has remarked, the bulk of the TTP is a close and 
critical reading of the Torah (First Testament), nonetheless Spinoza’s target – both in 
terms of an audience and of his critique – is Christian.14 It was the different churches, 
as opposed to “the Jews, Turks or pagans”(6), that were feuding for political authority, 
and to Spinoza’s dismay, abusing this power as a means to validate their theological 
beliefs (and forcefully silence all opposition). Spinoza felt compelled to interrupt what 
we now know to be his Ethics, in order to try to understand and react to this 
censorship and abuse of power. Whether it was as Jonathan Israel claims, the specific 
event of the arrest of the Koerbach brothers (Adriaan and Johannes),15 or simply the 
decreasing lack of tolerance for philosophical freedom he experienced, as Steven 
Nadler suggests, or the need to explain his actions which led to his 
excommunication,16  Spinoza clearly felt compelled to respond to this theological-
political conflict. So what solution does Spinoza propose to preserve peace?  
Vera religio - true religion, a term that should be distinguished from the notion 
of religio vera which refers to an ethics or moral conscience associated with a challenge 
to the Catholic Church. It was common practice, among both late ancient writers and 
modern writers, to associate the term religio to the term religare. Religare means to gather 
together, to create bonds between, or to place a shared obligation upon.17 It is in this 
sense that religion is a term that is closely associated with the creation and preserving 
of a community. However, with Cicero, a new twist is added to the notion of religio. It 
is also derived from religere (re-legere) that means to read again (re-read) or to look over 
again. It is thus after Cicero that the notion of religio is often associated with 
community or with a shared text. Surprisingly given that Spinoza’s aim is by no means 
common or theological; this is precisely what Spinoza does.  
 
When I considered these and a great many other things, … I resolved 
earnestly to examine Scripture afresh, with an unprejudiced and free spirit, to 
affirm nothing about it, and to admit nothing as its teaching, which it did not 
very clearly teach me 18 
Vera religio, true religion, is to read the Scriptures without bias in order to 
create a bond that overcomes sectarian divisions and thereby ensures peace. This 
binding together of subjects is, according to Spinoza, the formal role of true religion – 
a clearly political role albeit one that relies on his particular interpretation of 
theological texts. Constraining himself “to affirm nothing about it, and to admit 
nothing as its teaching, which it did not very clearly teach me”,19 Spinoza seeks to 
clarify the source of theological quarrels that has led to sectarian squabbles. He starts 
by clarifying what aspects of the Bible are particular to the Jewish people and what 
aspects are universal. While he is clearly concerned with Christian conflicts, his 
strategy is to address these problems in analogous Jewish terms in order to avoid 
directly confronting his readers. It is essential to his project that he demonstrate that 
the message of the Scriptures, more clearly presented by the prophets of the New 
Testament, is a universal one with no divine preference for any group, sect or 
community. “That each Jew, considered alone and outside that social order and state, 
possesses no gift of God which would place him above other men, and that there is 
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no difference between him and a gentile.”20 This is not to mean that Spinoza wishes 
to deny external differences. Rather, just as children fight for their parents’ love, under 
the false illusion that the latter have a preference – different sects do so under the 
illusion that they must vie for God’s love. He therefore investigates the Scriptures in 
order to prove that what is needed for salvation is universally accessible.  
By denying the particularity of the Jews with regard to prophecy, Spinoza 
seeks to disassociate the Scriptures from the election of the Hebrews. A refutation of 
this supposed chosenness is the basis for his claim that the message of the Scripture is 
universal. It is also explains why prophecy is the first aspect of the Scriptures Spinoza 
analyses. To support this claim, he provides an account of what is the source and 
nature of prophecy, distinguishing between two types, one by means of the 
imagination – demonstrated by all prophets of the Torah, and the other by means of 
the mind – reserved for Jesus. This same distinction appears in the following chapter 
between theology, which is rooted in the imagination of the theologian and as such is 
limited, and philosophy, which is based in reason and is therefore universal. Having 
established what prophecy is and how it arises, he now asks, in chapter three, if it is in 
fact a gift particular to the Jews? Spinoza demonstrates that the supposed preference 
is a result of the fact that the book was written for and by the Jewish people and deals 
specifically with their society, in terms of its composition and organisation.21 As such, 
the vocation of the Hebrews is a particular contingent historical fact justified on the 
basis of their particular commonwealth. Having sought the origin of the supposed 
“election of the Hebrews” in the Scriptures, Spinoza can now conclude that its origin 
arises from a misinterpretation of the Scriptures, and specifically its narratives (as 
shown in chapter five). In chapter three, he explains that the Jews have incurred the 
hatred of all because “they have separated themselves from other nations” (47). It is 
this separation, and the implicit arrogance this entails, that is the cause of this hatred. 
What is worth noting is that implicitly he is drawing an analogy to the hatred and 
intolerance towards different Christian sects. Spinoza therefore concludes that in 
harmony with nature, the Scriptures cannot be read as showing a divine preference for 
a particular people but rather must be read as the source of a universal message. He 
further supports his conclusion by way of a close reading of selected passages from 
the Torah in chapters six through ten. While he claims to lack expertise and therefore 
does not engage in such a detailed reading of relevant sections of the Second 
Testament, he does not shy away from concluding that:  
The greatest of the Prophets, Moses, did not make any argument in due form. 
On the other hand, I grant that Paul’s long deductions and arguments, as we 
find them in his Letter to the Romans, were not in any way written from a 
supernatural revelation.22  
 
This is a remarkably strong claim from someone who, just a few pages earlier, 
declared himself unqualified to engage in a close reading of the Second Testament. It 
is thus the apostles, in their writings (without external signs) who teach true religion 
(170, XI, 12). Why does Spinoza promote Paul’s prophetic talents and yet challenge 
his view on faith as taking precedence over works? This tension adds to the 
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ambiguities about the meaning of true religion. It is to this, and many other 
ambiguities with regard to the meaning of true religion, that we now turn having 
established that true religion’s formal purpose is to create peace (collective), or 
salvation (individual), in a diverse community united by true religion. For Spinoza, 
true religion, formally speaking, is the glue that holds a political community together. 
Much like civic religion, which has done away with the referent to true, it is a political 
response to plurality. In this vein civic religion is the first of true religions floating 
signifiers (in which the reference to truth disappears after having been emptied out to 
such an extent that it is no longer considered significant).   
 
The ambiguous meaning(s) of true religion in the TTP 
We now turn to the meaning of true religion in the TTP, in which Spinoza 
proposes to separate true religion “from philosophic speculations and reduced to 
those very few and very simple doctrines Christ taught his followers.”23 In particular, I 
will consider the equivocity between: A) reason and imagination, B) faith and works 
and c) theology or philosophy. It is worth noting that, at least rhetorically, Spinoza 
continues to pay lip service to true religion’s theological origins. It is by means of this 
reduction and simplification of the diverging dogmas, doctrines and narratives both 
between Judaism and Christianity, and, secondly, between different Christian churches 
(Calvin, Socinians, etc) that Spinoza can be seen to begin the process of fusing 
Judaism and Christianities. While both Jews and Christians were initially appalled and 
refuted such fusions, by the 18th century when atheism was seen as a greater threat 
than fusion, the idea of such fusions slowly became less controversial. Coalitions of 
Christian groups who previously had fought, now found themselves working together 
to combat the rise of atheism that Spinoza symbolically represented.24 It is also in this 
sense that one of the contemporary floating signifiers, which arose out of the term 
“true religion,” is the political concept of Judeo-Christianity (either as a form of 
supersessionism or the basis for a civic morality). “The preface of the Treatise both 
makes clear Spinoza’s contempt for sectarian religions and opens the way for his 
reductive and naturalistic explanations of central doctrinal and historical elements of 
the Judeo-Christian traditions.”25 
 
A. Is true religion a matter of reason or imagination?  
Let us begin by examining the contents of chapter twelve in which Spinoza 
provides a first account of the reduction from speculation to doctrine. 
Those who consider the Bible, just as it is, as a Letter God has sent men from 
heaven, will no doubt cry out that I have committed a sin against the Holy 
Ghost … But I don’t doubt that if they were willing to weigh the matter 
carefully, they would immediately stop protesting. For both reason itself and 
the sayings of the Prophets and Apostles clearly proclaim that God’s eternal 
word, and his covenant, and true religion, are inscribed by divine agency in 
the hearts of men, i.e., in the human mind.26 
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A first ambiguity surrounding the meaning of true religion is apparent. 
Previously in the TTP, Spinoza makes it clear that metaphorical language appeals to 
the imagination and as such is solely for the multitudes.27 As Spinoza appeals to such 
language here, he must believe that true religion is meant for the multitudes but then 
why does he associate it with reason, and not with the imagination of the hoi polloi? Is 
true religion for the philosopher or the plebs? Should this claim be read to mean that 
those able to reason and philosophise don’t actually need the Scriptures? Is true 
religion necessary for both the thinker and the people, or are there two distinct forms 
of true religion? This would possibly explain why Spinoza uses both metaphorical and 
natural language. This question is central to the different readings of true religion, still 
present in Spinoza scholarship today – over three centuries after the publication of the 
TTP28, which demonstrates the fundamental ambiguity about the nature, rational or 
inventive, of true religion.   
Spinoza only adds to this controversy by arguing that the word of God (dabar 
jehova) is not confined to any particular set of books, sacred or otherwise. While this 
follows from his arguments in the first half of the TTP, it implies that true religion is 
not blessed. Is true religion purely rational and completely disconnected from faith? 
How can true religion be sacred if it can be found in any book and is not limited to 
sacred texts? And, if it is not blessed, how can it lead to salvation? According to 
Spinoza, this can be explained as follows. If “the word of God” is predicated of some 
subject which is not God himself, it means properly that Divine law which we treated 
in Ch. 4, i.e. that is, the religion common to the whole human race, or universal 
religion.”29 The problem arises from the ambiguous language of the Scriptures, and 
more specifically, due to the diction of the particular author who according to Spinoza 
is not speaking from natural light. Only when the phrase dabar jehova is used without 
reference to God, should it be read as true universal religion for all peoples. The true 
way of life, which is inscribed in our minds and not exhibited by means of external 
ceremonies, is true religion “whose eternal author is God.”30 In other words, true 
religion, often confusingly labelled “word of God” in the Scriptures, is a universal 
lesson concerning the true way of life. Spinoza seemingly resolves this problem by 
clarifying a formal semantic ambiguity. And yet, the problem is not one of form, but 
of content – why does Spinoza keep shifting away from the meaning of true religion 
towards its form? 
This same shift, from content to form, arises in Spinoza’s warning concerning 
the confusion between the word of God (davar jehova) and the mind of God. He does 
not explain what the mind of God is as this would require a substantial debate 
Spinoza engages with in the Ethics (published posthumously). Instead, he draws 
further formal distinctions in order to better classify and categorise “the mind of 
God”. Whereas “the word of God” is limited to the realm of morality, “the mind of 
God” is part of the realm of truth. This raises a further ambiguity, as concerns the 
meaning of truth in relation to reason. How can true religion actually be true if it, 
unlike the “mind of God” is not located in the realm of truth? If, as Spinoza claims in 
the first paragraph of chapter twelve, true religion is not in opposition to reason, then 
why is it now opposed to truth? Again, while several renowned Spinoza scholars are 
able to make sense of this contradiction, many others challenge any such 
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reconciliation attempts.31 Thus while it is clearly possible to explain these ambiguities, 
the need to do so is evidence of Spinoza’s emptying out of this concept which allows 
for radically different interpretations.  
It might be the case that Spinoza’s desire, prudential or conceptually 
motivated, not to engage in a substantial debate, which he was concomitantly 
developing in the Ethics, leads to this repeated shift away from meaning; a shift that is 
the source of true religion’s equivocity. If this were the case, it would be ironic in that 
Spinoza criticises those theologians who squabble about differences in letters, 
markings etc., clearly criticising not only the theologians in his time but also the 
squabbles between the Sadducees and Pharisees during the second Temple period. 
These latter debates, like those in the Netherlands in the 17th century are theological 
squabbles with political motives, specifically concerning leadership of the Jews, 
squabbles taken up in the second testament in terms of Paul’s critique of the 
Pharisees.32 Spinoza is critical of these petty theological squabbles and yet he uses a 
similar semantic strategy to avoid defining true religion either in terms of reason or 
imagination. 
 
B. Is true religion a matter of faith or works?  
This second ambiguity concerning true religion’s internalisation situates itself 
in a much broader debate between faith and works, central to the entire project of the 
Reformation. Painting in broad brushstrokes, the Pauline inspired Protestants sought 
to define true religion in terms of faith alone whereas the Petrine (or James) inspired 
Catholics sought to define it in terms of acts. Spinoza, perhaps unsurprisingly, seems 
to want it both ways. As we saw above in his critique on Judaism, he clearly wants to 
free true religion from all rules, and rituals. This would imply that he sides with the 
Pauline definition of true religion as a matter of faith alone. Yet, by the conclusion of 
chapter twelve, Spinoza’s definition of true religion is reduced entirely to the notion of 
justice and charity, an entirely external matter, which would position his notion of true 
religion within the Petrine interpretation. Let us now consider this latter account of 
true religion in terms of works, before either accepting yet another inherent ambiguity 
of true religion or finding a means to reconcile this tension.   
Continuing where he left off, in terms of true religion as the universal 
teaching or moral contained in the scriptures, Spinoza offers this first substantial 
definition.  
 
To love God above all else, and to love your neighbor as yourself. For if 
Scripture ever taught anything other than this, it would also have had to teach 
everything else differently, since this is the foundation of the whole religion.33 
… The remaining moral precepts must be held to be no less uncorrupted, 
since they follow with utmost clarity from this universal foundation: to 
defend justice, to aid the poor, to kill no one, to covet nothing belonging to 
another, etc and so on.34 
True religion is intended to encourage one to love God and the other, 
expressed in terms of justice and charity. How is this definition of true religion to be 
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squared with the “Pauline vision” of an entirely private and internalised faith? Spinoza 
is correct to acknowledge that “both Testaments commend [justice and charity] 
everywhere, in the strongest terms”35, yet this does not resolve the tension between 
faith and works. Given that Spinoza’s goal is to prevent conflict, he reduces true 
religion to obedience fundamental for peace and tolerance. Furthermore, as justice 
and charity are easy to emulate, it minimalizes obstacles to obedience for the 
multitudes. This, as chapter thirteen explains, is exactly the purpose true religion 
serves; its simplicity assists its audience as its simple message ensures that it is 
accessible to those without any philosophical abilities (which points towards the first 
ambiguity).  
 
For this it’s necessary to show, before anything else, that the intellectual, or, 
exact, knowledge of God is not a gift common to all the faithful, as obedience 
is. Next, we must show that the knowledge God, through the Prophets, has 
demanded of everyone, without exception, the knowledge everyone is bound 
to have, is nothing but knowledge of his Divine Justice and Loving-kindness. 
Both these things are easily demonstrated from Scripture itself. 36 
 
While knowledge of God is limited to the few, obedience is imitable and 
accessible in non-philosophical terms in the scriptures for everyone. This definition of 
true religion restates the gap between reason and the imagination but further 
problematizes the ambiguity between faith and works. Whereas Spinoza criticises 
Judaism for not internalising true religion, he now defines it solely as a matter of 
works and obedience. This is precisely what he states in the preface: 
 
I show [chs. 12 & 13] that the revealed Word of God is not some certain 
number of books, but a simple concept of the divine mind revealed to the 
Prophets: to obey God wholeheartedly, by practicing justice and loving 
kindness.37 
 
True religion is the act of obeying God by practicing justice and charity. And 
a few lines later he states: “we must judge the piety of each person’s faith from his 
works alone.”38 This claim affirms Spinoza’s preference for works over faith and yet 
an important ambiguity remains as he also claims that true religion must be 
internalised, as is faith according to Paul. While it is possible to make sense of this 
ambiguity, it is my contention that Spinoza’s analyses serves more to empty this 
signifier of its contents than to clearly choose sides. As such, the ambiguity between 
faith and works, like that between reason and the imagination, is inscribed into 
Spinoza’s definition of true religion. 
 
C. Is true religion a matter of philosophy or theology?  
A third ambiguity concerning the meaning of true religion lies in the 
relationship between revealed religion and reason. While Spinoza clearly separates true 
religion from revealed religion in the first part of the TTP, he only addresses true 
religion’s relationship to faith in the second part, and specifically in chapter 14 (as 
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announced in the preface). “Having shown the fundamentals of faith [in ch. 14], I 
conclude finally that revealed knowledge has no object but obedience, and indeed that 
it is entirely distinct from natural knowledge.” 39 Thus, while Spinoza is able to draw a 
sharp distinction between revealed and natural knowledge, this does not help clarify 
where to situate true religion. On the contrary, it simply adds to its ambiguity and 
cryptic character. However, as some of his readers have suggested it might be 
necessary to consider the meaning of the term “faith” here as an alternative to true 
religion.40  
 
From all this we conclude that the intellectual knowledge of God, which 
considers his nature as it is in itself (a nature men cannot imitate by any 
particular way of life and cannot take as a model for instituting the true way 
of life), does not in any way pertain to faith or to revealed religion.41 
 
The question we must now consider is what is the relationship between faith 
and true religion (as opposed to revealed religion). In the 17th century, it was faith, and 
not religion, that was the term most used in public discourse and pamphlets. 42 
Religion was the righteous practice of faith (as opposed to faith being the virtuous 
practice of religion). Furthermore, “the term religio was also beginning to be employed 
politically to distinguish Protestantism from Roman Catholicism,”43 with true religion 
being opposed to the false religion of the Church defined by its superstition, rituals 
and dogma. This helps us to situate Spinoza’s usage of true religion as a critique of 
prophecy, rituals, miracles and other superstitions. It also explains why Spinoza is 
obliged, as he himself states, to deduce from true religion the doctrines (or tenants) of 
faith. One of the meanings of religion, in the 17th century, was the virtuous practice of 
these beliefs.  
For Spinoza, the tenets of faith serve to motivate, and ensure, that all obey 
and interact with others in accordance with both justice and charity. In this vein, he 
states, it is important to appreciate that different persons, communities etc., with their 
particular geographical, historical and cultural specificities must each be able to 
develop their own practices with regard to the true way of life and pleads for freedom 
of belief. This is what he refers to in the preface as “freedom of judgment” with 
regards to the foundation of one’s faith. What logically follows from this position 
would be a refusal to establish a “true” set of beliefs. And yet isn’t this precisely what 
Spinoza does in chapter 14? Yet again, we are forced to ask: why? If there is only one 
requirement to obey God and thereby act in accordance with justice and charity, why 
does it matter what one’s motives are? How can Spinoza expect a philosopher to be 
motivated in the same fashion as a theologian or a Jew in the same manner as an 
atheist? This seems to suggest that true religion is necessary for both philosophers and 
the faithful. But then what happens to the distinction between reason and the 
imagination? It seems that every time we resolve one ambiguity regarding the meaning 
of true religion, we re-open another. Was this what Spinoza intended? Regardless of 
intention, the result of this intertwined series of ambiguities is a roadmap towards the 
emptying out of true religion’s theological meaning.  
  
 
 
 
Society and Politics                                                                        Vol. 8, No. 1(15)/April 2014 
51 
So this command itself is the unique standard of the whole universal faith. 
Only through it are we to determine all the doctrines of that faith, the beliefs 
everyone is bound to accept. Since this is very plain, and since everything can 
be deduced legitimately from this foundation alone, by reason alone, everyone 
may judge for himself how so many disagreements could have arisen in the 
Church.44 
This shifting equivocity resurfaces in this explanation of the relationship 
between true religion and the doctrines of faith. Can the beliefs necessary for true 
religion be legitimately deduced by reason alone? The theologians, who have made 
recourse to the imagination and not reason, have clearly failed to deduce the correct 
sets of tenants of faith. To avoid further violence, which arises from this limitation of 
the imagination with regard to the deduction of these doctrines, Spinoza feels obliged 
to do so. The problem of course is that as soon as he does so, he closes the door to 
freedom of judgment – which is precisely what he did not intend to do – and seems to 
re-open the door to a form of faith as the internalisation of a list of doctrines. 
Is true religion internal or external, is it something invisible – an inner 
spirituality, or is it something visible – by means of public ritual or distinct 
appearances? Spinoza states that the early Jews were like children, implying that they 
need imaginative bedtime stories to quell their irrational fears, since the divine law had 
not been internalised. This suggests that external practices, such as those of the Jews, 
are gratuitous for true religion. True religion is for adults, and adults do not need to 
publically parade their beliefs, which are meant to be private and internalised. This 
interpretation is in line with readings of Spinoza that associate his TTP with a 
Protestant project of privatising faith, separating belief from praxis and works. This is 
precisely the claim Emmanuel Levinas counters in his essay “A Religion for Adults,”45 
in which he questions a freedom that relies on the disappearance of differences. In 
this manner of interpreting Spinoza, Levinas follows precisely in the Judaic line of 
Hermann Cohen and Leo Strauss. While it is clear that true religion must be detached 
from the public performance of rituals, and that Spinoza wishes to dissociate it from 
the dogma or legalism stereotypically associated with Judaism – it is not clear that true 
religion can be gauged other than by means of its external expression.  
Although it has been argued that these doctrines are intentionally vague 
enough to leave space for all views ranging from those of believers to those of non-
believers, 46  the reference to Christ according to the Spirit (christus secundum 
spiritum) in the seventh tenant makes this claim more difficult to support.47  
According to Spinoza, these doctrines are necessary to ensure obedience 
which implies that any beliefs that contradict, or put these into question, should not 
be permitted as they pose a risk to the guarantee of obedience – a dangerous path for 
someone seeking to pursue peace. So again, why does he do it; and specifically, why 
include the final doctrine, particular to Christianity, concerning salvation? How are we 
to understand this contradiction? Is the purpose of true religion salvation or peace 
(one is forced to ask as it no longer seems possible to have both)? How, as he states in 
the title, can both piety and philosophy be fundamental to the peace of the Republic? 
Or, phrased otherwise, in what sense is true religion either true or religion? Has it, by 
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means of the reduction of theology/faith to true religion, not been emptied out (and 
thereby transforming it into a floating signifier)?  
This fundamental question remains unresolved in the Tractatus.  Spinoza, in 
the end, refuses to risk fully disclosing his own “faith”, or as others have suggested, 
perhaps he himself had not yet fully developed his own position. This is patently 
evident in chapter 15 in which he avoids conclusively answering the handmaiden 
question – who has the final word: reason or theology? While he dedicates two-thirds 
of the TTP, and the first 27 paragraphs of chapter 15, to significantly limiting 
theology, and religious authority, he concludes by making a radical concession to 
theology:  
 
I maintain unconditionally that this fundamental tenet of Theology cannot be 
tracked down by the natural light - or at least that there has been no one who 
has demonstrated it - and therefore that revelation has been most necessary. 48 
While this is clearly a concession, it is a source of contention whether it is a 
concession to theology or to reason. Has Spinoza just undermined all that comes 
before this claim or was he simply acting prudently? It is this puzzle that, in the end, 
empties out the notion of true religion. By leaving such fundamental ambiguities 
unresolved, Spinoza creates a space for a diverse array of interpretations of true 
religion. While true religion was, prior to Spinoza, of great theological import, it has 
now become a political charged floating signifier. Moreover, lest one think that the 
continuation of this age old struggle between reason and theology is the final word on 
true religion, let us recall that this struggle is fundamentally connected to the two 
other ambiguities investigated here, those between reason and imagination and 
between faith and works, with all of the theological and political implications each 
entails. Each of these three ambiguities, in its own way, acts as a linchpin for the 
transformation of true religion into a floating signifier.  
 
2. True Religion’s Ambiguities: The Birth of a Floating Signifier 
By analysing these intertwined ambiguities embedded in Spinoza’s notion of 
true religion, I have identified three sites of contestation that have, both in the 
Spinoza reception literature and in the public sphere, led to many diverse and 
opposing interpretations. By probing these tensions, Spinoza began the process of 
emptying out the signifier “true religion.” While this emptying out was by no means 
direct – it was surprisingly quick; this swiftness was certainly amplified by the 
changing cultural context of the 18th century and the rise of atheism. In this third part, 
I would like to dwell on the contemporary philosophical and political spectres of true 
religion as a floating signifier of theological-political significance. What remains, often 
only as a trace, of true religion after it has been emptied out is not any particular 
theological content (its original meaning) but rather its political purpose. The floating 
signifier is one that serves a particular political community, both its rulers, whom it 
helps in terms of organisation, and the ruled, whom it comforts. “The hermeneutic 
exercise of the TTP aims at expounding theology as a non-cognitive but distinctly 
cultural and political practice of securing social control.”49  And it is perhaps this 
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advantage, above all else that has made the theological-political floating signifier of 
true religion survive and thrive since the publication of Spinoza’s TTP. 
In Spinoza’s time, different religious groups were constantly vying for 
political authority, each claiming to be the followers of the one true religion. It seems 
that at least from the Reformation onwards, true religion” was embedded in a culture 
of violent hatreds.”50 By analogy, today’s political communities – regional, national 
and trans-national – are all hunting for “the true religion” necessary to construct, and 
conserve, their particular political communities. That a political community needs 
such a bond has rarely been contested, but the nature of this bond remains one of the 
most contested political questions. Given the context of contemporary communities 
marked by diversity and conflict, the question of “true religion” is never far from the 
surface although its phrasing has taken on a non-theological mask, first enabled by 
Spinoza’s secularisation of true religion. After considering some of these masks, by 
way of a survey of the TTP”s reception history, I consider the contemporary political 
implications of the floating signifier of true religion.  
 
A. True Religion’s Floating Significations 
While the political power of true religion remains, its theological content has 
now been emptied out. This in turn creates what we might refer to as an ideological 
amphitheatre. Historically and conceptually, the competing concerns, or most famous 
productions, staged in this theatre began with:  
 
The polemics on atheism during Spinoza’s lifetime, to the pantheism debate, 
which was a prelude to German idealism, from the debate between neo-
Kantians and post-Hegelians during the second half of the nineteenth 
century, to the late twentieth-century Marxist-inspired French and Italian 
Spinozisms.51 
 
As Spinoza’s reception history closely parallels the different interpretations of 
true religion, I now connect each debate in the literature to one of the three 
ambiguities identified above.  
Spinoza, as is clear from his correspondence with Oldenburg following the 
publication of the TTP, was not surprised that true religion was interpreted to be 
masked atheism (Letter 30 to Oldenburg, 1665). He refers to concern within the TTP 
itself.52 It is well known that Spinozism was a synonym for atheism. The German 
theologian Jacob Thomasius, writing in the spring of 1670, declared the TTP a 
“godless document.”53  Other well known responses to the TTP were that it was 
“forged in hell,” “harmful to all religions,” “an atheistic book full of abominations,” 
and that its goal “was to destroy all religions and particularly the Jewish and Christian 
ones.” 54  This reading of the TTP was further confirmed with the posthumous 
publication of the Ethics as “The first words of his Ethics are: De Deo. But this is no 
longer the Jewish or Christian God.”55 At the end of the 17th century, it seemed clear 
to all, true religion was neither true nor religion – it was the enemy of all religions. 
While this is perhaps stating the obvious, this relates clearly to the third ambiguity, the 
handmaiden question. There was no doubt in the mind of the readers at the end of 
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the 17th century that Spinoza’s supposed concession to revelation was without any 
earnestness.  
While the current intellectual wind seems to be sweeping once again in the 
direction of true religion’s fundamental atheism (this is not to suggest that the atheism 
of the 17th century can be equated with atheism today), this may be more because of 
our own need to justify the ideological project that is secularism (rather than due to 
revolutions in Spinoza scholarship). In this vein, could today’s Judeo-Christian 
tradition, often cited in support of today’s secularist political agenda, be a 
contemporary example of Spinoza’s true religion? After all, the French cite Spinoza as 
the foundational thinker of their national true religion – laïcité.56  
Yet, less than a century later, this conclusion was radically put into question 
during the Pantheismusstreit, an event that played a pivotal role in European intellectual 
history. Sparked by Jacobi’s 1785 critique of Lessing as a closet Spinozist, a debate 
began between the former and Moses Mendelssohn in which the meaning of true 
religion is drastically altered. In his lectures on Lessing, Mendelssohn redefined 
Lessing’s interpretation of Spinoza’s true religion in terms of a purified pantheism, 
that is, a natural religion or rational religion. In response to conventional charge 
against any thinker espousing Spinozistic positions, Mendelssohn argues that 
Spinozism, and more specifically the refined pantheism of his dear friend Lessing, was 
not atheism.57 He claimed that Spinoza himself was partially to blame, because of the 
lack of clarity with regard to such fundamental terms as substance and true religion 
but also that many “Spinozists” had not paid close enough attention to his intended 
meaning and motivation.  
 
So, too, with words and concepts. The slightest deviation in the 
determination of a fundamental term leads in the end to completely opposite 
consequences, and if one loses sight of the point from which one set out in 
common with others, then in the end one no longer disputes about words, 
but about the most important matters. We must, therefore return to the 
crossroads where the Spinozist leaves us and takes his own route, in order to 
see whether we cannot settle our dispute before we go our separate ways.58 
Mendelssohn returns to Spinoza in order to explain that his system is 
incomplete without “the spirit world” and as such the motivation is a deistic one. 
While he concurs that pantheism is not the proper path for believers, it is still a form 
of true religion and not to be confused with atheism, and that the proof of this was 
that it strengthened the political community by promoting tolerance and virtue.59  
It is thus during the second round of Spinoza reception history that the third 
ambiguity returns to centre stage but this time lacking the certainty of the previous 
debate. True religion, according to Mendelssohn, can be understood as a bridge 
between theology and reason, a natural religion or rational theological. While the 
Pantheismusstreit may have begun as a debate regarding the third ambiguity in the 
concept of true religion, the pivotal role it played in European intellectual history 
actually relates to the first ambiguity between the imagination and reason. It is in fact 
the debate about the three kinds of knowledge from the Ethics (Book 2, P 40, S 2), 
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which first appears in the TTP, that is a central debate in German Idealism. 60 
According to Goethe, Jacobi’s fundamental error is to fail to appreciate the difference 
between these three kinds of knowledge.61  
It was perhaps the Pantheismusstreit, more than any other event that paved the 
path for the transformation of Spinoza’s true religion into a floating signifier. At the 
end of the 18th century, for many European intellectuals, the true religion was deism, a 
true religion that would greatly inspire the leaders of both the American and French 
revolutions. Interestingly, while it might be said that the French have gone the route 
of true religion’s 17th century interpretation, 62  the Americans – according to 
sociologist of religion Christian Smith – have followed the path of this 18th Scottish 
century interpretation. His research defines the current true religion in America as 
“moralistic therapeutic deism”, which consists of the following beliefs:   
 
1. “A god exists who created and ordered the world and watches over human 
life on earth.” 2. “God wants people to be good, nice, and fair to each other, 
as taught in the Bible and by most world religions.” 3. “The central goal of 
life is to be happy and to feel good about oneself.” 4. “God does not need to 
be particularly involved in one’s life except when God is needed to resolve a 
problem.” 5. “Good people go to heaven when they die.”63 
 
It is however during the third wave, in the debate between neo-Kantians and 
post-Hegelians that one can best observe the entire range of competing concerns, an 
antagonism that was both philosophical and political. This range spans from Hermann 
Cohen’s vitriolic denunciation of Spinoza’s Judaism as all things Spinozist, to the 
Christian Right Hegelians’ Protestant account of true religion, most evident in David 
Strauss’s account of the historical Jesus (Strauss was also a member of the Tubingen 
School of F.C. Baur), all the way to the political project of a purely immanent 
historical materialism of the left Hegelians. It is also during this third debate that the 
controversy between works and faith, between religion as public or private (which 
rages on today in Europe as is clear from the rhetoric of Islamophobia), returns. The 
form this controversy takes concerns the need for transcendence in the political realm. 
Is it possible to have a purely immanent true religion, a purely material, political 
community or is it necessary to make redress to a higher spirit or transcendence – to a 
higher source?  
While the above is just a snapshot (of the many) competing concerns that the 
floating signifier of true religion had come to mean in the 19th century, it more than 
sufficiently displays true religion’s political equivocity and plasticity. On the one hand 
the theological evacuation of true religion completed by Spinoza paved the path for a 
purely immanent true religion, a binding together of a political community without 
recourse to an outside. On the other hand, by separating theology from politics, 
Spinoza can be said to have saved it, and thereby paved a path to the laïc state in 
which citizens were free to hold any beliefs as long as they obeyed the sovereign and 
acted justly and charitably towards their fellow citizens. Still for others, Spinoza freed 
revealed religion from its medieval chains, preparing it for modernity and the need for 
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a true religion that could act as an overlapping consensus for the diversity of faiths 
that characterise the modern nation-state.  
 
B. The transformation of true religion into a floating signifier  
The question I hope to have provoked by providing a sampling of the wide 
array of competing concerns that have been hosted by the floating signifier that once 
was true religion relates to the political implications of such a malleable and politically 
charged floating signifier. In order to demonstrate how each of the ambiguities 
identified and teased out by Spinoza in the TTP, and further “emptied out” in its 
reception history, enables its transformation into a floating signifier; I consider one 
implication that corresponds to each tension. The point of course is not to be 
comprehensive; an impossibility given that there is no end imaginable to signification 
but rather to demonstrate how Spinoza’s bold exposition of true religion, and 
specifically with regard to the three ambiguities defined above, enables it partial 
evacuation and translation into a contemporary political floating signifier.  
The first of these three ambiguities, that between reason and imagination, 
points towards the “who” of the political community. Who is the “we” that defines a 
political community? One extreme, that of reason, sees the who as defined by a small 
elite. On the other extreme is the “who” defined by imagination, by all regardless of 
their status. Is the peace or freedom central to Spinoza’s true religion that of the few 
or the many, the elite or the multitudes? If true religion is only the possession of the 
few capable of reason, then inclusion in the political community is very restricted. By 
contrast if true religion finds its origins in the imagination, the people are the political 
sovereign, a vision put forward by the fourth wave of Spinoza scholars such as the 
Marxist-inspired French and Italian Spinozists such as Matheron, Balibar and Negri. 
This question is even more controversial today – who is a political subject? Who is a 
citizen? Who is permitted to participate? Is it, as some theorists content, only those 
capable of rational speech or economic contributions to the state?  
A second implication, which arises from the ambiguity between faith and 
works, raises the equally fundamental political question of the role of religion with 
regard to the public and private realms. The larger context of this debate is the 
question of whether the true foundations of Christianity are to be found in Paul or 
James/Peter. 64  While mainstream Protestantism take the path paved by Paul by 
defending the claim that man is justified by faith alone, Catholics take the path laid out 
by James in defending man as justified by works. This remains a fundamental concern 
today when we debate whether religious expressions, such as the skullcap, cross or 
veil, are acceptable in the public sphere. If, as Jews and Catholics claimed in Spinoza’s 
time, religion is a matter of works – it cannot be limited to the private sphere. By 
contrast, if it is a matter of faith, an internal commitment, there is no need for religion 
in the public sphere. 
Yet another implication of this second tension plays itself out in political 
struggles with regards to the debate on citizenship. Is one a member of a particular 
political community because of an intrinsic or extrinsic quality? To elucidate this 
contrast crudely, consider the difference in citizenship criteria in France vs. Germany. 
While the former is based on works, that is obedience and participation (albeit 
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reduced to a trivial level in the form of elections), Germany has a jus sanguinis (blood-
based) conception of citizenship.65 One answer to this question is Habermas’ true 
religion – constitutional patriotism. Habermas’ notion of constitutional patriotism 
contends that a common constitution is necessary for the formation of a political 
community. In this manner, a common constitution plays the role of the floating 
signifier of true religion by being the shared basis for the bond between members. 
 
The citizens of Europe will not be able to consider themselves as members of 
a single political body until they vote for a common Constitution. Only then 
will they be able to accept that the responsibilities are distributed more evenly 
beyond the borders. 66 
 
As for the third, and most defined, paradox in Spinoza’s notion of true 
religion – the handmaiden question – this has had some very adverse affects for the 
meaning of democracy. If I may be permitted to speculate, one of the theological-
political effects of true religion is the expectation of the silent majority that their 
leaders, who have symbolically taken up the role of God, “save them,” that is, provide 
them with a clear path for “the good life.” This is the trade-off for the obedience, and 
non-interference, of the multitudes. This is visible in terms of today’s democratic 
deficit and the decreasing tolerance (and increasing criminalisation) for civil 
disobedience (with “science” often playing the role religion did in the past). The 
alternative, close to the vision shared by thinkers in the line of radical democracy, 
demands an active and critical political agency as opposed to passivity. 
 
Conclusions 
While there is undoubtedly no direct link between these contemporary 
debates and Spinoza’s TTP, if one grants my argument that true religion has been 
transformed into a theological-political floating signifier, then it is possible to 1) 
establish an indirect link between these debates and Spinoza’s true religion, and 2) 
recognise how some of the conflicts exposed by Spinoza continue to reappear today 
in our polis. It is this that I hope to have demonstrated by means of a textual analysis 
of true religion in the TTP, in part one and two of this paper, in which I locate and 
analyse the ambiguities at play in the concept of true religion; and, in part three, in 
which I trace and develop the implications of such a floating signifier of true religion.  
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